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W hen a neutral country such as the United States has a rather sizeable naval force in a confined area for the protection of vessels flying its 
flag, it is inevitable that components of that force will, at times, find themselves 
in anned confrontation with ships and military aircraft of belligerents in that 
area. In the Iran-Iraq war, ships and military aircraft frequendy attacked the 
tankers that the U.S. Navy had been sent to the Persian Gulf to protect, or even 
attacked components of the U.S. Navy itsel£ There are several discrete examples 
of just such confrontations. 
On August 10, 1987, a U.S. Navy fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian 
plane which had violated the "bubble" announced by the Navy as a measure of 
self-protection.! And on August 25, 1987, a U.S. destroyer fired across the bows 
of two small unidentified vessels which were approaching the tankers that the 
destroyer was escorting? On April, 18, 1988, in retaliation for the damaging of 
an American warship, United States anned forces attacked and destroyed two 
Iranian oil platfonns (which were also used as anti-aircraft platfonns) and U.S. 
naval vessels engaged in a subsequent encounter with Iranian vessels, all of which 
resulted in heavy Iranian casualties. However, as the individuals on the platforms 
were given warning of the attacks which were about to take place, and Iranian 
tugboats were pennitted to engage in rescue work without impediment by the 
U.S. forces, no Iranians were rescued from the sea by the latter.3 
The first two incidents tenninated with no damages, no casualties and no 
individuals in custody. The third incident tenninated with both Iranian casualties 
and "splashed" personnel, but again with no individuals in custody. The question 
these examples pose concerns the status of the members of the crews of such 
ships or aircraft when they are disabled, sunk or shot down by the U.S. forces 
* This article is a revision of remarks delivered at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the 
American Society ofInternational Law Panel on Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping and 
the Use of Force in the Persian Gulf War, 23 April 1988. See Levie, Remarks, 82 PROC. 
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 597 (1988). 
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while they are engaged in such attacks, or while they are committing other illegal 
acts against U.S. flagged merchant shipping, or warships, or planes, and when 
they are thereafter rescued from the sea by those forces. I refer to "ships" rather 
than "warships" because there exists a considerable question regarding the status 
of some of the Iranian warships involved. 
Article 14 of the 1910 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with 
Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea states that it does not apply to "ships 
at war." However, article 11 (1) of the same Convention provides that: 
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his 
vessel, her crew and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even though an 
enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost.4 
This humanitarian rule should be and in fact was complied with by the U.S. 
naval forces in the Persian Gul£ For example, an Iraqi pilot whose plane had 
been shot down by the Iranians was rescued from the sea by a component of 
the U.S. naval forces. Shortly thereafter he was turned over to the Iraqi 
authorities. On the night of September 21-22, 1987, an Iranian vessel, later 
identified as the Iran Ajr, was observed by a U.S. Army helicopter equipped with 
night-vision sensors to be laying mines in the Gulf in the vicinity of U.S. naval 
vessels and an anchorage used by them and the tankers they were there to protect. 
When the minelayer disregarded the radio orders of the helicopter to discontinue 
its minelaying activity, the helicopter opened fire on the Iranian vessel and 
rendered it dead in the water.5 Twenty-six Iranian seamen and three bodies 
were subsequendy rescued from the sea by a component of the U.S. naval 
forces.6 Similarly, on October 8, 1987, when a U.S. helicopter flying over the 
waters of the Persian Gulf was fired upon by a gunboat, it returned the fire. Four 
wounded Iranians and the bodies of two others were recovered from the sea by 
a component of the U.S. naval forces? Were the individuals who were rescued 
after these incidents prisoners of war? While the question is moot at the moment 
as all of the individuals were quickly repatriated through the agency of the 
government of Oman, it is one which may require a hard decision at some time 
in the future. 8 
Common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the 
Treatment of War Victims is the article concerned with the circumstances under 
which those Conventions are to be applied.9 It provides that: 
[T]he present Convention shall apply in all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. 10 
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A number of years ago the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
produced lengthy, and what have subsequendy become authoritative, 
commentaries with respect to each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Each 
of these commentaries contains a substantially identical statement with respect 
to common article 2. The pertinent portions of the Commentary on the 1949 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War state that: 
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of 
members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 
2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no 
difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how 
numerous are the participating forces; it suffices for the armed forces of one Power 
to have captured adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4. Even if there 
has been no fighting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are detained is 
s'1fficient for its application. The number of persons captured in such circumstances 
. f . ·al 11 IS, 0 course, Immaten . 
This will be an acceptable interpretation of the provisions of common article 
2 in the great majority of cases. However, in some respects, and under some 
circumstances, it may be too all-encompassing. When Major Arthur D. 
Nicholson of the United States Army was shot and killed by a Russian soldier 
in the Potsdam area on March 25, 1985, and his sergeant-driver was held prisoner 
at gunpoint for a number of hours, he certainly constituted a person "covered 
by the Convention" who was "detained.,,12 But was there an "armed conflict" 
between the Soviet Union and the United States? Were the provisions of the 
Prisoner-of-War Convention applicable to the sergeant? When Lieutenant 
Robert O. Goodman of the United States Navy was shot down by the Syrian 
Army on December 4, 1983, and was taken into custody by the Syrians and held 
for one month before being released, once again there was certainly a person 
"covered by the Convention" who was "detained.,,13 But was there an "armed 
conflict" between Syria and the United States? Were the provisions of the 
Prisoner-of-War Convention applicable to the lieutenant? The original 
announcements made by both U.S. officials and the Syrians appeared to assume 
that he was a prisoner-of-war.14 However, the United States appeared to have 
changed its position. President Reagan later stated: "I don't know how you have 
a prisoner of war when there is no declared war between nations. I don't think 
that makes you eligible for the Geneva Accords.,,15 
Although an isolated incident of the use of force between two nations may 
be considered by one or both of them to be indicative of the existence of an 
armed conflict between them, usually the nations involved will wish to keep 
their options open and will not consider that such an incident has initiated an 
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armed conflict-unless the very purpose of the incident was to serve as a basis 
for such a claim.16 
The first question to be decided, then, is whether there is an armed conflict 
between the parties. The ICRC takes the position that such incidents as those 
which occurred in the Persian Gulf in September and October 1987 constitute 
armed conflict and bring the Convention into play.17 I do not agree with that 
conclusion. But even assuming arguendo that the ICRC position is correct, this 
alone will not always solve the problem. 
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention specifies the 
categories of persons who are entided to the status of prisoners of war. First 
among these categories are "[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict as well as militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces.,,18 The Iranians who were recovered from the sea by the U.S. Navy on 
September 22, 1987, were ~parendy members of the Iranian navy and the vessel 
was an Iranian warship. If there was an armed conflict and if the 
Prisoner-o£.. W ar Convention was applicable, they would unquestionably come 
within the coverage of the quoted provision and would be entided to the 
protection afforded by the Convention. 
Suppose, however, tha~ they had been members of the "Revolutionary 
Guards"-the individuals who appear to compose the crews of the so-called 
"gunboats" which attack any and every ship found in the Persian Gulf, without 
regard to the £lag that it flies or the cargo that it carries?O Do such individuals 
fall within the category of persons entided to prisoner-of-war status when they 
are rescued by U.S. naval forces from the waters of the Persian Gulfinto which 
they have been precipitated by action of those same armed forces? Or are they 
illegal combatants who are not entided to the benefits of that status? While we 
really know very litde about the organization of the Revolutionary Guards, it 
would appear that they are, at a minimum, members of a militia or volunteer 
corps forming part of the Iranian armed forces. Under these circumstances, and 
under the ICRC interpretation of the Convention provision, they, too, are 
entided to the status of prisoners of war if they fall into the hands of another 
power during a period of armed conflict. It is very possible that they have been 
guilty of violations of international law inasmuch as they have, without waming, 
attacked unarmed, neutral vessels. But this does not affect their entidement to 
prisoner-of-war status. It only means that they could be subjected to trial and 
punishment for their illegal acts-an unlikely event. 
My conclusion, then, is that occasional incidents do not constitute a state of 
war, or even of armed conflict, if there is a difference, between the United States 
and Iran or Iraq. Therefore, none of the Iranians who have been, or who are 
likely to be, "splashed" and rescued by United States forces in the Persian Gulf 
have been, or will be, entided to prisoner-of-war status. It must be borne in 
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mind, however, that a decision that there is no anned conflict and that an 
individual is, therefore, not entided to prisoner-of-war status only means that 
he is not entided to the protection of all of the specific provisions of the 1949 
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention. It does not mean that he is unreservedly 
at the mercy of the power in whose custody he finds himsel£ He is still entided 
to all of the protection of general humanitarian law. For example, he must receive 
any necessary medical care, he may not be denied adequate food and water, he 
may not be tortured or otherwise maltreated, he may not be treated as a hostage, 
etc. 
One final aspect of the problem is worthy of mention. It is not beyond the 
realm of possibility that some American military personnel serving in the Persian 
Gulf will, in the future, fall into the power of the Iranian regime. It will 
undoubtedly be recalled that the holding of hostages is not an unknown 
phenomenon to that regime. It is devoudy to be hoped that the precedent that 
the United States has established of immediate repatriation will contribute to 
making it politically inexpedient for Iran to hold such American personnel as 
hostages, as might otherwise have occurred. 
Addendum 
Even disregarding the perennial Arab-Israeli controversies, during the past 
decade international crisis has followed international crisis in the Middle East in 
general, and in the Persian Gulfin particular. Iran and Iraq fought a bloody war 
from 1980 to 1988, a war which necessitated the establishment of a naval 
presence in that area by half a dozen nations in order to protect neutral merchant 
shipping. During 1984, the mystery of the mines in the Red Sea posed grave 
difficulties for Egypt and its Suez Canal and necessitated a multilateral force to 
clear the mines from the sea. During the 1980s there was rarely a moment when 
the internecine conflict in Lebanon was not costing lives, with international 
interventions on a number of occasions.21 Then, on 2 August 1990, less than 
two years after the Iran-Iraq conflict had come to an inconclusive halt, Iraq, 
under Saddam Hussein, invaded, occupied, and annexed its neighbor, Kuwait, 
bringing down upon its head the wrath of the great majority of the members of 
the international community, including most of the fifteen members of the 
Security Council of the United Nations. Military forces from thirty nations 
concentrated in Saudi Arabia and when non-military actions such as economic 
blockades proved ineffective in inducing Saddam Hussein to recognize the error 
of his actions, the Security Council authorized Kuwait and its cooperating 
"coalition" states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement 
Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions" if Iraq had not 
complied with the mentioned resolutions by 15 January 1991.22 This was, of 
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course, a euphemistic way of authorizing the use of armed force while avoiding 
the need for any unpalatable words. 
Aerial bombardment began shortly after the deadline. Inevitably, coalition 
planes were shot down and crew members became prisoners of war of the Iraqis. 
In this instance there was no question with respect to the applicability of the 
1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention.23 Although Iraq became a party to 
this Convention in 1956, she paid as little attention to its provisions in this 
conflict as she had during the Iran-Iraq War.24 In the other direction there was 
a fairly substantial number of Iraqis who elected to become prisoners of war 
rather than fight for Saddam Hussein. The ground war started late in February 
and within a matter of days the number ofIraqi prisoners of war in the custody 
of the members of the coalition reached the tens of thousands.25 Delegates of 
the ICRC immediately began visiting these prisoners of war, a process which 
thereafter continued without interruption. 
When Iraq capitulated and agreed to comply with the provisions of the 
previous Security Council resolutions, Security Council Resolution 686 (1991), 
set forth the requirements to be imposed on Iraq in order to warrant a cease fire. 
The resolution contained the following provision: 
3. Further demand that Iraq: 
(c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war 
under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and return 
the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the Member 
States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resoiution 678 (1990) .... 26 
On March 6, 1991, Iraq released thirty-five prisoners of war, asserting that 
that was all she held?7 Shortly thereafter the coalition commenced the 
incremental repatriation of the Iraqi prisoners of war who had expressed a desire 
for repatriation?S That process was to continue until all Iraqi prisoners of war 
who desired repatriation were back in Iraq. 
Notes 
1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1987, atAl, col. 6. 
2. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,1987, atAl, col. 6. 
3. N.Y. Times, Apri119, 1988, atAl, col. 6. 
4. 1910 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, 
37 Stat. 1658, 1672 (1910) (emphasis added). 
5. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,1987, atAl, col. 6. 
6. N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 23,1987, atAl, col. 6. 
7. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at Al, col. 6. Although it has not been possible to ascertain whether the 
individuals in this latter group were Iranian naval personnel or members of the so-called "Revolutionary 
Guards," they were probably the latter. When queried on this point at the time of the first incident, the 
Administration spokesperson stated that the United States did not consider this question to be important. N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 25,1987, atA8, col. 6. 
Splashed and Rescued 245 
8. Mter the September repatriation had been accomplished, the ICRC, which had been an observer at 
the turnover, delivered a note to the United States authorities in which it was asserted that "such situations 
and their consequences fell within the scope of the Geneva Conventions." 27 Int'I Rev. Red Cross 650 (No. 
261, November-December 1987}. 
9. See 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136. 
10. Of course, neither the United States nor Iran recognized the existence of a state of war between them. 
During the early 1950s, when the Netherlands and Indonesia were engaged in hostilities over what was then 
Dutch New Guinea, the Netherlands took the position that the Convention was not applicable because both 
countries chose to consider that a state of war did not exist. F. Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging ofWa( 
27 (1987}. 
11. III Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWa( 23 o. 
Pictet ed. 1960) (emphasis added). Concerning the problem that arises when neither side recognizes the 
existence of a state of war, the Commentary further states: 
What would the position be, it may be wondered, if both the Parties to an armed conflict were 
to deny the existence of a state of war? Even in that event it would not appear that they could, by tacit 
agreement, prevent the Convention from applying. It must not be forgotten that the Conventions 
have been drawn up first and foremost to protect individuals, and not to serve State interests. 
12. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26,1985, at AI, col. 6. 
13. N.Y. Times,Jan. 8, 1984, § 4, at 1, col. 1. 
14. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,1983, at AS, col. 1. 
15. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1983, at A22, col. 6. It should be noted that the President made a major error 
in each of these two short sentences. He erred by implying that a "declared war" was a prerequisite for bringing 
the Convention into effect. He further erred in referring to the "Geneva Accords," the title given to the 
agreements that ended the French war in Indochina in 1954, instead of to the "Geneva Prisoner-of-War 
Convention." 
16. Typical of the latter type ofincident was the "attack" on the German radio station by "Polish" troops 
which created the basis for Hitler going to war with Poland in 1939. 
17. See supra note 8. A representative of the ICRC has informed the author that the note did not refer 
to the specific incident but was a general note sent to all countries having naval forces in the Persian Gul£ 
18. See supra note 9; 6 U.S.T. at 3319, T.I.A.S. at 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138. 
19. Letter of President Reagan to Congress, 24 September 1987, 87 Dep't of State Bull. 44 (No. 2128, 
Nov. 1987}. 
20. This probably describes the Iranians involved in the October 1987 and the April 1988 incidents. 
21. L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1990, at A21, col. 1. Approximately forty thousand members of the Syrian Army 
have been in Lebanon for fifteen years and are still there. 
22. U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990). 
23. See supra note 9. 
24. After obvious physical maltreatment, Iraq presented several of the pilots on television, a violation of 
article 13 of the Convention. With respect to Iraqi (and Iranian) treatment of prisoners of war during their 
conflict, see Prisoners of War in Iran and Iraq: The Report of a Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-General, 
U.N. Doc. S/16962, 22 February 1985, para. 51-158, 271-294. 
25. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1991, atA14, coL 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,1991, atA14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 28,1991, atAI0, col. 1. 
26. U. N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 569 (1991). 
27. N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,1991, atA14, col. 5. 
28. Bulletin of the International Committee of the Red Cross, April 1991, at 1, col. 2. 
